Journal Articles
"A Sellarsian Argument for Nonlinguistic Conceptual Capabilities." Synthese, 2024.
While it is philosophically contested whether nonlinguistic animals can have conceptual capabilities, it is also philosophically contested whether one can even empirically test for such capabilities. I draw from Sellars’ work on psychological nominalism to develop an empirically tractable means of distinguishing between tasks that require conceptual capabilities and those that do not. Tasks that require conceptual capabilities are those that require awareness of abstract relations, whereas tasks that can be solved merely through Sellarsian picturing do not. I argue that relational matching-to-sample tasks cannot be solved through picturing and therefore require awareness of the abstract relations of same and different. Crows and amazons have both been able to succeed at relational matching-to-sample tasks; therefore, there are at least some nonlinguistic animals that have conceptual capabilities. Finally, I consider the objection that one cannot attribute conceptual capabilities without also attributing knowledge, and Sellarsian conditions for knowledge are beyond the capabilities of any nonlinguistic animal. In response, I argue that Sellarsian conditions for knowledge only require an implicit grasp of the is/looks distinction and empirical work with chimpanzees on their understanding of the appearance/reality distinction demonstrates that they can meet this standard. Therefore, language is not necessary for meeting Sellarsian conditions for knowledge.
"Kantian Animal Moral Psychology: Empirical Markers for Animal Morality." Ergo, 2024.
Abstract: I argue that a Kantian inspired investigation into animal morality is both a plausible and coherent research program. To show that such an investigation is possible, I argue that philosophers, such as Korsgaard, who argue that reason demarcates nonhuman animals from the domain of moral beings are equivocating in their use of the term ‘rationality’. Kant certainly regards rationality as necessary for moral responsibility from a practical standpoint, but his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal means that he can only establish it as a marker for morality from a theoretical standpoint. This means that when it comes to evaluating the moral capabilities of others, rationality can be neither necessary nor sufficient for morality, leaving open the possibility of other empirical markers for moral responsibility. I argue that the higher faculties, character, implicit knowledge of universality, and antecedent practical pleasures (which provide a way to distinguish between morally motivated behaviour and other types of socially motivated behaviour) can all serve as empirical markers for morality. There is empirical evidence that at least some animals have conceptual capabilities and therefore the empirical marker of the higher faculties. In addition, there is suggestive evidence that merits further investigation for the other three markers. While this will not provide a definitive answer on whether animals are capable of acting morally, it will provide a Kantian outlook that can be used to evaluate empirical and philosophical work on animal morality.
Abstract: I argue that Pepperberg's work with Alex (and other African grey parrots) provides evidence that the vocal articulations of at least some parrots have conceptual content. Using Frege's insight that numbers assert something about a concept, I argue that Alex's ability to answer the question "How many?" depended upon a prior grasp of conceptual content. Frege's theoretical insight and Pepperberg's empirical work provide reason to reconsider the capabilities of parrots, as well as what sorts of tasks provide evidence for conceptual content.
Abstract: I argue that a demand for justification of the very inferences that are required for justification (i.e. in the problem of induction), is deeply confused. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I argue that justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. Separating justification from the structure of the inference (e.g. deduction or induction) so that one can be used to ground the other is then a misunderstanding of the essentially binded structure these concepts have.
Book Reviews
Other Publications
“Animals that can do math understand more language than we think.” The Conversation, May 28, 2020.
Abstract: Some philosophers claim that understanding a word requires one to understand its connection to other words. Using this claim, they have argued that talking animals, like parrots, are only capable of mimicry. Using Frege's insight into the structure of number concepts, I argue that nonhuman animals who can count or do basic arithmetic demonstrate that they understand these connections. The linguistic capabilities of humans are therefore less unique than we tend to think.
Header Photo Credit: The Take Off by @greatgatsbyphotography