Research

Abstract: This paper presents a general account of scaffolding explanations that fits with previously recognized uses in cognitive science and evolutionary biology that can also be extended to other areas, such as AI and biochemistry. Scaffolding explanations are causal explanations that explain how a system realizes, maintains, or acquires a capacity/property by interacting with an arrangement of entities and activities external to the system. I show the potential of this general account by using it to interpret empirical work on the capacity of large language models for long-range reasoning. The general account also shows the ways in which scaffolding explanations differ from other basic types of causal explanations, such as etiological (e.g., causal history), constitutive (e.g., mechanistic), and developmental explanations. Scaffolding explanations have different explananda than etiological explanations, and unlike constitutive and developmental explanations, they are able to attribute the realized capacity/property to the system that interacts with the scaffold, instead of the constitutive whole which includes both the system and the scaffold. This means that scaffolding explanations are a unique type of causal explanation. However, there are cases where competing empirically adequate and internally coherent constitutive and/or developmental explanations can be offered. Using research on the evolution of multicellularity as a case study, I argue that, in at least some cases, there are pragmatic reasons for preferring the scaffolding explanation over these alternatives. This analysis shows that there are cases where pragmatics will play an essential role in philosophical work on scientific explanation. 

Abstract: Normative conceptual holists have argued that conceptual capabilities can only be acquired through language. The a priori nature of their argument means that, if it is correct, not only is it a mistake for scientists to attribute conceptual capabilities to nonlinguistic animals, but also a mistake to think that empirical results have any bearing on such a claim. I argue that the absurd conclusion that concept acquisition is impossible can be derived from the claims that motivate this argument. Normative conceptual holists can avoid this result, but only by giving up the claim that linguistic and conceptual capabilities are necessarily linked. It follows that it is an open and empirical question whether nonlinguistic animals have conceptual capabilities.

Abstract: While it is philosophically contested whether nonlinguistic animals can have conceptual capabilities, it is also philosophically contested whether one can even empirically test for such capabilities. I draw from Sellars’ work on psychological nominalism to develop an empirically tractable means of distinguishing between tasks that require conceptual capabilities and those that do not. Tasks that require conceptual capabilities are those that require awareness of abstract relations, whereas tasks that can be solved merely through Sellarsian picturing do not. I argue that relational matching-to-sample tasks cannot be solved through picturing and therefore require awareness of the abstract relations of same and different. Crows and amazons have both been able to succeed at relational matching-to-sample tasks; therefore, there are at least some nonlinguistic animals that have conceptual capabilities. Finally, I consider the objection that one cannot attribute conceptual capabilities without also attributing knowledge, and Sellarsian conditions for knowledge are beyond the capabilities of any nonlinguistic animal. In response, I argue that Sellarsian conditions for knowledge only require an implicit grasp of the is/looks distinction and empirical work with chimpanzees on their understanding of the appearance/reality distinction demonstrates that they can meet this standard. Therefore, language is not necessary for meeting Sellarsian conditions for knowledge.

Abstract: I argue that a Kantian inspired investigation into animal morality is both a plausible and coherent research program. To show that such an investigation is possible, I argue that philosophers, such as Korsgaard, who argue that reason demarcates nonhuman animals from the domain of moral beings are equivocating in their use of the term ‘rationality’. Kant certainly regards rationality as necessary for moral responsibility from a practical standpoint, but his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal means that he can only establish it as a marker for morality from a theoretical standpoint. This means that when it comes to evaluating the moral capabilities of others, rationality can be neither necessary nor sufficient for morality, leaving open the possibility of other empirical markers for moral responsibility. I argue that the higher faculties, character, implicit knowledge of universality, and antecedent practical pleasures (which provide a way to distinguish between morally motivated behaviour and other types of socially motivated behaviour) can all serve as empirical markers for morality. There is empirical evidence that at least some animals have conceptual capabilities and therefore the empirical marker of the higher faculties. In addition, there is suggestive evidence that merits further investigation for the other three markers. While this will not provide a definitive answer on whether animals are capable of acting morally, it will provide a Kantian outlook that can be used to evaluate empirical and philosophical work on animal morality.

Abstract: I argue that Pepperberg's work with Alex (and other African grey parrots) provides evidence that the vocal articulations of at least some parrots have conceptual content. Using Frege's insight that numbers assert something about a concept, I argue that Alex's ability to answer the question "How many?" depended upon a prior grasp of conceptual content. Frege's theoretical insight and Pepperberg's empirical work provide reason to reconsider the capabilities of parrots, as well as what sorts of tasks provide evidence for conceptual content.

Abstract: I argue that a demand for justification of the very inferences that are required for justification (i.e. in the problem of induction), is deeply confused. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I argue that justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. Separating justification from the structure of the inference (e.g. deduction or induction) so that one can be used to ground the other is then a misunderstanding of the essentially binded structure these concepts have.